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from the serviee without fault on their part the petitioners, 
by virtue of the statute, became entitled to the "lump sum 
payment.'' This is no gift of public money; it does not present 
petitioners with anything of value which they have not 
earned; it is merely an alternative method of settling a cur-
rent account which the state has found to be advantageous to it. 
Much that is said in my dissent in Tre1t v. Kirkwood, * (Cal.) 
255 P.2d 409, is equally applicable here. 
Since no error of law resulting in miscarriage of justice is 
shown the judgment should be affirmed. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied April 30, 
1953. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
. [Sac. No. 6281. In Bank. Apr. 3, 1953.] 
L. J. JARVIS, Petitioner and Appellant, v. A. H. HENDER-
SON, as Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles, 
etc., et al., Respondents and Appellants. 
[1] Civil Service- Statutory Authorization.- A state highway 
patrol officer's appointment was not contractual, based on the 
assumption that he was appointed in 1931 by the board of 
supervisors of his county pursuant to California Vehicle Act 
of 1923, § 30 (Stats, 1923, ch. 266, p. 520), where, prior to 
his appointment, the statute had been amended to provide 
for appointment of traffic officers by the chief of the patrol 
with salaries fixed by the director of public works and to 
bring all appointees within civil service status (Stats. 1929, 
ch. 308, pp. 617-619), and the amendment eliminated the prior 
provision for appointment by contract between the chief of 
the division and the board of supervisors. 
[2] Id.-Compensation.-The salary of a civil service employee 
is fixed by statute and rule of the State Personnel Board, 
and may not be altered by contract. 
[3] !d.-Compensation-Overtime Work.-In the absence of a 
statute specifically authorizing compensation to a civil serv-
[2] See Cal.Jur., Civil Service, § 6; Am.Jur., Civil Service, § 17. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Civil Service, § 1; [2, 3, 6, 7] Civil 
Service, § 8; [ 4, 5] Labor, § 4.5. 
*A rehearing was granted by the Supreme Court on May 1, 1953. 
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ice employee in addition to a fixed monthly salary, there is 
no right to payment for overtime. 
[4] Labor-Hours of Public Employees.-When the salary of a 
civil service employee is fixed by time, as by the day or 
month, the employee is bound, in the absence of statute, to 
render services without regard to the number of hours worked, 
and the rule is equally applicable to work performed on what 
otherwise would have been days off or holidays. 
[5] !d.-Hours of Public Employees.-!£ time off for what other-
wise would be days off or holidays is not granted a civil 
service employee by statute, it is then included within the 
period for which the employee is being paid his salary and 
is time when he may be required to perform services. 
[6] Civil Service-Compensation-Overtime Work.-The statutes 
enacted in 1943 providing for a normal work week for civil 
service employees and payment for overtime (Stats. 1943, 
chs. 20, 1041; now Gov. Code, §§ 18005, 18020-18021, 18023-
18024) and in 1945 allowing time off on holidays or compensa-
tion therefor (Stats. 1945, ch. 1016, p. 1962; now Gov. Code, 
§ 18025) were not, and could not be, retroactive. ( Const., 
art. IV, § 32.) 
[7] !d.-Compensation-Overtime Work.-Where, at the time a 
state traffic officer was assigned to the duties of personal 
bodyguard and chauffeur for the governor, there was no 
statute permitting additional compensation for services re-
quired to be performed at the monthly salary fixed for his 
position, he may not recover compensation for hours worked 
in excess of regular hours of duty. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sac-
ramento County and from an order denying motion to va-
cate the judgment. B. F. Van Dyke, Judge. Reversed with 
directions. 
Proceeding in mandamus to compel payment of claims for 
overtime worked by a state traffic officer. Judgment for 
petitioner reversed with directions. 
· Earl D. Desmond and George W. Artz for Petitioner and 
Appellant. 
Fred N. Howser and Edmund G. Brown, Attorneys Gen-
eral, and Wilmer W. Morse, Deputy Attorney General for 
Respondents and Appellants. 
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EDMONDS, ,J.-The principal question here, as in Martin 
v. Henderson and Redwine v. Henderson, ante, p. 583 [255 
P.2d 416], is whether a former state highway patrol officer 
is entitled to payment for hours worked prior to February 
6, 1943, in excess of regular hours ·of duty, for which he re-
ceived no compensating time off during his period of service. 
An additional question presented is whether such officer may 
receive payment for work performed before that date on 
clays which normally would have been days off or holidays. 
'I' he facts are undisputed. Jarvis entered service with the 
highway patrol in April, 1931, and was appointed to the civil 
service position of state traffic officer in March, 1933. In 
July, 1934, he was assigned to the duties of personal body-
guard and chauffeur for the governor. This assignment termi-
nated in January, 1939, when he returned to the regular duties 
of a state traffic officer. He resigned from the department 
on January 31, 1948. 
It is stipulated that between January 1, 1935, and December 
31, 1938, Jarvis worked 129 days more than would have been 
required by a six-day work week less all legal holidays. Be-
tween January 1, 1935, and August 31, 1939, it is stipulated 
that he worked 7,682 hours in excess of what would have been 
required of him had his duties been confined to an eight-hour 
day. A further stipulation is that his salary was fixed on a 
monthly basis and was fully paid. 
In July, 1944, Jarvis demanded equivalent days off for 
the claimed 129 extra days of work. On September 1, 1944, the 
chief of the highway patrol denied his request upon the 
ground that any right to compensating time off was suspended 
by Headquarters General Order No. 295. In 1945, he filed an 
affidavit of his claim for overtime, pursuant to Information 
Bulletin No. 323 issued by the chief of the highway patrol. 
'fhis claim was rejected on August 21, 1945, by Headquarters 
T nformation Bulletin No. 329 and he never received any com-
pensating time off for such overtime. 
The chief of the highway patrol on May 17, 1933, issued 
Headquarters Information Bulletin No. 52, effective im-
mediately, providing that traffic officers "will take two suc-
cessive days off every second week.'' Headquarters General 
Order No. 243, issued on .July 23, 1936, permitted the accumu-
lation of days off under certain circumstances and provided 
for the allowance of "time off in lieu of owrtime." Accord-
ing to tl1e order: "Effective immediately, all days lost and 
time accumulated previous to ,January 1, 1936, are cancelled.'' 
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Effective Oetober 1, 1939, lleaclqnarters General Order No. 
295 canceled Bulletin No. 52 and Order No. 243. It sus-
pended ''all acr·umulati ve days accumulated prior to ,January 
1, 1939." In addition, it provided: "In the future employees 
ordered by their superiors to work on their regular days off 
or legal holidays, will be allowed a day in lieu thereof which 
will be termed an accumulative day. All accumulative days 
approved by the immediate superior must be taken as soon 
thereafter as is JH'actical and at the convenience of the serviee. '' 
lt also provided for time off for overtime work. (Martin v. 
II enderson, supra.) 
Order No. 295 was eanceled by Headquarters General Order 
No. 394, effective August 5, 1942. By the new order: "All days 
accumulated prior to January 1, 1939 remain suspended." It 
provided that : ''Employees ordered to work on their regular 
days off or on legal holidays will be allowed a day in lieu 
thereof ·which shall be termed an accumulative clay. Squad 
Commanders shall arrange for the taking of accumulative days 
as rapidly as possible without undue impairment of the ser-
vice." Provision was also made for time off in lieu of over-
time. (Martin v. Hende?"Son, supra.) 
Information Bulletin No. 287 was issued December 9, 
1942, in clarification of Order No. 394. It stated that "it is 
entirely optional with the immediate superior whether com-
pensating time off is allowerl and when it shall be taken. If 
au employee is resigning ... any overtime MUST BE ALLOWED 
BEFORE EMPLOYEE WORKS HIS FINAL DAY .... There is nothing 
in the Patrol regulations which establishes a mandatory eight 
hour day. The determination of what constitutes overtime 
and if and when compensatory time off shall be taken is to be 
made by the immediate superior of the individual concerned . 
. . . Any individual who believes he is being discriminated 
against has the right to appeal his case through the proper 
ehannels to Headquarters.'' 
On September 29, 1943, Headquarters General Order No. 
428 canceled Order No. 394. It provided that state traffic offi-
cers ''shall not receive compensating time off for time worked 
in excess of their normal work schedule or be permitted 
to accumulate overtime for such work.'' Also, when a state 
traffic officer ''is required to work a full shift or longer on a 
day that he is not normally required to work he shall be 
allowed a compensating day off. If the compensating day off 
cannot be granted within ten days without unduly impairing 
the services of the California Highway Patrol, the employee 
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shall be permitted to accumulate to his credit such compensat-
ing day off, provided that he shall at no time be entitled, 
without the consent in writing of the Chief of the California 
Highway Patrol, to a greater total than ten working days.'' 
Order No. 428 was superseded by Headquarters General 
Order No. 432, permitting the accumulation of days off for 
work done in addition to a six-day week less legal holidays 
after November 17, 1943. This order was in turn canceled 
by Headquarters General Order No. 448 on September 5, 
1944, which permitted "compensating time off in lieu of over-
time worked, provided that in no event shall it be permissible 
for any person to accumulate a total greater than 240 uncom-
pensated overtime hours. . . . (Ordinary 'days off' or 'holi-
days' worked since November 17, 1943, which formerly have 
been considered as 'accumulative days' under Headquarters 
General Order No, 432, shall be reduced to overtime hours 
worked and included in the maximum total of 240 hours)." 
On June 5, 1945, the chief of the highway patrol issued 
Information Bulletin No. 323 requiring proof of any claim for 
overtime hours accumulated prior to September 29, 1943. 
Each of the claims presented pursuant to this bulletin was re-
jected and all overtime hours claimed to have been accumu-
lated prior to September 29, 1943, were canceled by Head-
quarters Information Bulletin No. 329, issued on August 21, 
1945. (MaTtin v. Henderson, supra.) 
The first statute authorizing payment upon separation for 
accumulated overtime became effective February 6, 1943. 
(Stats. 1943, ch. 20, § 2, p. 136; now Gov. Code, § 18005; 
Martin v. Henderson, supra). On June 7, 1943, section 73 was 
added to the State Civil Service Act (Stats. 1937, ch. 753) 
providing for a ''normal work week'' to be established by 
the State Personnel Board for each civil service class and 
requiring overtime compensation or time off in lieu of over-
time. (Stats. 1943, ch. 1041, § 1, pp. 2976-2977; now Gov. 
Code, §§ 18020-18021, 18023-18024.) Not until September 15, 
1945, was there any statute entitling civil servants to time 
off on designated holidays or to compensation or time off in lieu 
thereof for holiday work. (Stats. 1945, ch. 1016, p. 1962; 
Gov. Code, § 18025.) 
The trial court found that, during the period Jarvis worked 
overtime, an eight-hour work day was established as normal fo:r 
all members of the highway patrol and all time worked beyond 
that was compensated by equivalent time off as a matter of 
right. The understanding that such time off would be granted 
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was, the trial court found, "a part of the contract of employ-
ment entered into by and between the appointing power of the 
California State Highway Patrol and . . . Jarvis upon his 
entering the service ... ~ (in 1931) and continued to be part 
of said contract of employment during the term of his employ-
ment." It also found, as a part of the contract of employ-
ment, an understanding that one day out of every seven, exclu-
sive of holidays, should be a day off as a matter of right and 
if a traffic officer worked on a day which should have been a 
day off or holiday, he should be compensated by an equivalent 
day off. According to the findings, Jarvis was entitled to cash 
compensation for overtime and extra days for which time 
off had not been granted at the rate of pay he was earning 
at the time the overtime and extra days were worked. The 
court found that no cause of action arose to enforce com-
pensating time off for such hours and days until separation 
from service and no statute of limitation barred the present 
proceeding. It concluded that Jarvis' claims for cash payment 
for overtime hours and extra days should be allowed. 
After the court made its minute order that judgment be 
for Jarvis as prayed, he moved for leave to amend his petition 
to claim recovery upon the basis of $325 per month, the 
salary he was receiving at the time of his resignation. He 
also moved to set aside submission of the cause for the purpose 
of producing evidence in support of the proposed amendments. 
Following the denial of these motions, judgment was entered 
directing a peremptory writ of mandate to issue requiring 
the approval and payment of Jarvis' claims in the amount of 
$7,225.82 for overtime and $788.90 for extra days worked. 
The respondents' motions for a new trial and to vacate the 
judgment and enter judgment in their favor in conformity 
with the findings were denied. Both Jarvis and the respondents 
appealed from the judgment. The respondents also appealed 
from the order denying their motion to vacate the judgment 
and enter judgment in their favor. 
The respondents contend that ,Jarvis was paid a monthly 
salary which, by statute, constituted compensation in full for 
all services which might be rendered by him and no com-
pensation for overtime work or work on normal days off or 
holidays could be allowed in the absence of statute. They 
also argue that his claim is barred by the statute of limitations. 
In addition, they assert that Jarvis cannot be paid from funds 
of the highway patrol for work done as bodyguard and chauf-
feur, a position in the governor's office and not in the patrol. 
~ 
I 
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Jarvis, on the other hand, contends that his appointment 
was contractual, a condition of the contract being payment 
for overtime and work done on normal days off and holidays. 
He also argues that section 18005 of the Government Code 
operates retroactively to grant him compensation for such 
work. According to him, his cause of action is not barred 
by a statute of limitations and his position at all times was 
one within the highway patrol for which its funds are obli-
gated. In support of his appeal, he contends that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying his motion to amend the 
petition and that the judgment fails to conform to the statu-
tory method of computing the lump sum payment for accumu-
lated overtime and days off. 
[1] The contention that ,Jarvis' appointment was con-
tractual is without merit. It is based upon the assumption 
that he was appointed in 1931 by the board of supervisors of 
his county, pursuant to section 30 of the California Vehicle 
Ad of 1923. ( Stats. 1923, cb. 266, ~ 30. p. 520.) Howrwr. 
prior to his appointment, the statute had been amended to 
provide for appointment of traffic officers by the chief of the 
patrol with salaries fixed by the Director of Public Works and 
to bring all appointees within civil service status. (Stats. 
1929, ch. 308, § 1, pp. 617-619.) The amendment eliminated the 
prior provision for appointment by contract between the chief 
of the division and the board of supervisors. 
No statute or rule of the appointing authority author-
ized payment for either overtime or work on normal days off or 
holidays at any time prior to or during the period for which 
compensation is being claimed. Even had there been such rule 
or understanding affecting members of the highway patrol, it 
would have been unenforceable. [2] \\The salary of a civil 
service employee is fixed by statute and rule of the State 
Personnel Board, and may not be altered by contract. (Martin 
v. Henderson, supr-a; Boren v. State Personnel Board, 37 Cal. 
2d 634, 641 [234 P.2d 9811.) [3] In the absence of a statute 
specifically authorizing compensation in addition to a fixed 
monthly salary, there is no right to payment for overtime. 
(Martin v. IIencleJ·son, supra.) [4] When the salary is fixed 
by time, as by the day or month, the employee is bound, in 
the absence of statute, to render services without regard to 
the number of hours worked. (Robinson v. Dunn, 77 Cal. 
473 [19 P. 878, 11 Am.St.Rep. 297].) The rule is equally 
applicable to work performed upon what otherwise would 
have been days off or holidays. [5] If time off is not granted 
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by statute (cf. Pohle v. Chr·istian, 21 C:al.2d 8:3, 90 [130 P.2d 
417] ) . it is then inclndrd within the period for which thr 
Pmployre iR being paid hiR salary anrl iR timP when he may be 
requirrd to perform Rervices. ! 
[6] The statutes enacted in 1943 providing for a normal 
work week and payment for overtime (Stats. 1943, chs. 20, 
p. 1041; now Gov. Code, §§ 18005, 18020-18021, 18023-18024) 
and in 1945 allowing time off on holidays or compensation 
therefor ( Stats. 1945, ch. 1016, p. 1962; Gov. Code, § 18025) 
were not, and could not be, retroactive. (Canst., art. IV, § 32; 
Martin v. Henderson, supra; Robinson v. Dunn, supra, p. 
475.) [7] Because, at the time Jarvis did the work specified 
in his claim, there was no statute permitting additional com-
pensation for services required to be performed at the monthly 
salary fixed for his position, he may not recover. 
These conclusions make it unnecessary to consider the 
other contentions of the parties. 
The judgment and the order denying the motion to vacate 
the judg·ment are reversed with directions to the superior eourt 
to grant the motion and enter judgment denying the petition 
for a writ of mandate. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
GARTER, J.-I dissent. 
This ~ase presents the same questions involved in Martin 
v. Henderson and Redwine v. Henderson, amte, p. 583 
1255 P .2d 416], and for the reasons stated in my dissenting 
opinion therein, I cannot agree with the majority here. 
'l'he judgment of the trial court awarding the state em-
ployee compensation for overtime should be affirmed. 
SCHAUER, J.-Dissenting. 
The legal :'.3sues here are basically the same as, or similar 
to, those considered in Martin v. Henderson, a,nfe, p. 583 
f255 P.2d 416]. For the reasons stated in my dissent in the 
Martin case, I would affirm the judgment. 
